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Introduction
A Destructive Economic Policies in the Age of Terrorism1
The Age of Terrorism highlights that government sanctioned gambling is economically and politically 
destabilizing As exemplified by casinos gambling provides quick and substantial quantities of stable cash flow 
to the owners of the gambling establishments and particularly in less secure governmental systems the owners 
are often associated with groups dedicated to destabilizing the government such as organized crime terrorist, 
and rebel groups
One example of this phenomenon during the late 1990s was Yasser Arafat s and the Palestinian Authority s 
largest most profitable and most stable asset—a Jericho casino—built with U S gamblmg technology 
sanctioned by the Israeli government patronized by Israeli tourists and dedicated to finance the Palestinians 
destructive policy toward Israel 2 During the 1990s the Israeli government could have prevented the 
establishment of the Jericho casino but it did not,3 and the trend was even toward allowing more casmos and 
gambling activities
During the 1990s the world s economic leadership ensconced in the United States largely ignored the rapid 
spread of legalized gambling from the Nevada establishment into the United States and the international 
community This laissez faire attitude by U S governmental and economic policymakers signaled and 
encouraged the rapid embracing of the U S gambling industry s philosophies and technologies by other 
countries trying to emulate U S economic growth Lost in the differentiation between entrepreneurial policies 
enhancing long term economic efforts and gambling policies cannibalizing the short term economic wealth 
governments worldwide ignored or forgot the basic principle that government sanctioned gamblmg encourages 
transboundary economic raiding and destabilizes national and international economies On a strategic scale 
widespread government sanctioned gambling activities constitute inherently destructive economic policy
Specifically Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat divulged his administration s financial secrets in 2000 
revealing a multimilhon dollar slush fund to a state monopoly on cement and a $60 million share in a highly 
profitable casino 4 For years the international community had demanded that the Palestinian government
1 This particular article is summary in scope but it was conceived within the penumbra of the McDougal/Lasswell model for 
decision making In the areas of legal and governmental policy which subsume strategic socio economic and business 
concerns the classic decision making models were formulated by post legal realists m particular Professor Myres 
McDougal and Professor Harold Lasswell who postulated a conceptual framework for legal decision making m a landmark 
article directed toward legal educators and law professors Harold D Lasswell & Myres S McDougal Legal Education and 
Public Policy Professional Training in the Public Interest 52 Yale L J 203 (1943) see also Harold D Lasswell & Myres
S McDougal Criteria fo r  a Theory about Law 44 S Cal L Rev 362(1971) Myres S McDougal Jurisprudence for a 
Free Society 1 Ga L Rev 1 (1966) JohnW Kindt, An Analysis o f  Legal Education and Business Education Within the 
Context o f  a J  D/MBA Program 31 J Legal Educ 512 517 518(1981) JohnW Kindt, An Analysis o f  Legal Education 
and Business Education Within the Context o f a J  D /MBA Programme 13 LawTEACHER 12 14 16 (1979) The 
decision making concepts which McDougal and Lasswell introduced were later expanded to include international law and 
U S domestic law as these areas interfaced with policy-oriented jurisprudence Since then their approach to law has 
received increasing acceptance and has become the major approach in the area of international law See John N Moore 
Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence o f  Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell 54 Va L Rev 662(1968) Frederick 
Tipson Note The Lasswell McDougal Enterprise Toward a World Public Order o f  Human Dignity 14 Va J In t l L 535 
(1974)
2 Associated Press Arafat Divulges Financial Secrets N Y  TIMES (ON THE WEB) July 4 2000 available at
http //www nytimes com/aponline/i/AP Palestinian Money Trail html [hereinafter Arafat Divulges Financial Secrets]
* See e g  Presentation by Israeli Representatives National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling Annual Conf Orlando 
Fla Sept 27 29 1995
4 Arafat Divulges Financial Secrets supra note 2
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disclose its financial dealings which once revealed showed millions of dollars m tax revenues to secret 
accounts to which only Arafat and a few close advisers 5 had access Close to $530 million did not reach the 
Palestinian Treasury m 1998 and 1999 accordmg to a Palestinian financial report released in 2000 6 
Significantly the largest holdmg valued at $60 million was a thirty percent stake m a casino in the West Bank 
town of Jericho 7 Prior to the 2000 report, the Palestinian Authority refused to acknowledge its mvolvement 
in the casmo apparently fearing criticism 8 from the international community including Islamic 
fundamentalists who oppose gambling on religious grounds 9 These developments highlight the need for 
strategic analyses of government policies involving legalized gambling activities and their impact on national 
and international communities—particularly the economic security issues in the Age of Terrorism
B U S  Legalized Gambling as Destabilizing World Economies9
As countries around the world and the G7 periodically consider options to help pull their economies out of 
recurrent economic malaise many theories are being presented and evaluated Although many of the causal 
factors of economic downturns can be identified international policymakers and economists have missed the 
economic and political significance of the international megatrend toward legalizing organized gambling 
activities The U S gambling industry constitutes a classic example of an industry plagued by corruption and 
cronyism which was thematic of the destabilizing economic factors highlighted by President Clinton m his 
October 16 1998 speech at the IMF/World Bank Meeting Unfortunately the U S gambling companies have 
set the standards for the world and have touted themselves as the economic Svave of the future
Throughout the 1990s gambling activities were bemg organized and legalized on an unprecedented scale 
By 2000 the $614 billion m gross revenues of the U S gambling industry10 nearly doubled the combmed 
revenues of the entire U S sports movie music and theme park industries The academic research reviewed m 
this analysis demonstrates the destabilizing influence of gambling on most economic systems and suggests that 
it can even collapse the economies of less developed countries—due m part to their lack of safeguards and 
infrastructure 11 Gambling destabilizes economies due to negative externalities in the form of gamblmg 
addictions bankruptcies crime and corruption As quantified by reports delimited in this analysis the 
socio economic costs of legalized gambling far outweigh any possible benefits that it could bring to any 
economy
C New Addicted Gamblers Caused by Government Policies
New government sponsored gambling creates substantial numbers of new pathological (addicted) and problem 
gamblers For example in the United States from 1994 to 1997 legalized gamblmg created 1 5 million new 
pathological (addicted) gamblers 12 Pathological gamblmg is a recognized addictive behavior accordmg to the
sId 
6 Id 
7Id 
%Id
9 Arafat Divulges Financial Secrets supra note 2
10 Gross Annual Wager 22 INT L Gaming & WAGERING BUS 1 32 (2001) [hereinafter Gross Annual\
" Statement of Prof John Warren Kindt, Umv 111 to the National Gamblmg Impact Study Commission U S and 
International Concerns Over the Socio Economic Costs o f Legalized Gambling Greater than the Illegal Drug Problem? 
Chicago 111 May 21 1998 [hereinafter U S and International Costs] For tables indicating the extent and range of 
socio economic costs pursuant to expert analyses see John W Kindt, The Costs o f  Addicted Gamblers Should the States 
Initiate Mega Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases? 22 Managerial & DECISIONECON 17 Tables Al 14(2001) 
[hereinafter Mega Lawsuits]
12 See Howard J Shaffer Matthew N Hall & Jom Vander Bilt, Div on Addictions Harvard Medical School Estimating the 
Prevalence of Disordered Gamblmg Behavior in the United States and Canada A Meta Analysis 43 Tables 13 16 & 51 
(1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta Analysis] Press Release Harvard Medical School Harvard Medical School 
Researchers Map Prevalence o f Gamblmg Disorders in North America (Dec 4 1997) (findmg that from 0 84 percent ‘the 
prevalence rate [for pathological gamblmg] for 1994 1997 grew to 1 29 percent of the adult population )
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American Psychiatric Association (APA) 13 A 1994 resolution of the American Medical Association estimated 
the U S socio medical costs at $40 billion per year and these costs continued to mcrease 14
Associate Professor Howard J Shaffer of the Harvard Division on Addictions reported in 1995 Gambling 
is an addictive behavior make no mistake about it Gambling has all the properties of a psychoactive 
substance and again the reason is that it changes the neurochemistry of the bram 15 Addictions to gambling 
not only weaken society as a whole but impose a great burden on both gamblers and non gamblers alike in the 
form of increased taxes based on social costs running into the billions of dollars per year 16
D New Bankruptcies Caused by Government Sponsored Gambling
Although it is difficult to measure exactly how much the mcrease in bankruptcies is related to the mcrease m 
gambling a strong correlation exists The reason for the difficulty in measuring the effects of gambling on 
bankruptcy can be compared to the difficulty of measuring the exact effects of the 1998 Asian financial crisis on 
the U S stock markets
Accordmg to a 1997 study sponsored by the U S banking industry 17 it was established that a significant 
relationship exists between legalizing gambling and causmg new bankruptcies However the exact impact is 
difficult to measure due to the large amount of noise in the measurements University of Utah Law Professor 
Richard I Aaron believes the relationship between increased gambling and increased bankruptcy to be so strong 
and so obvious that to even question the relationship is simply not worth asking 18
£  New Crime and Corruption Caused by Government Sponsored Gambling
Virtually all pathological gamblers commit crimes but most are not prosecuted because the crimes are against 
family members or close associates Experts and studies report that between twelve and a half and twenty three 
percent of pathological gamblers will become incarcerated 19 Political scientists note that governments should 
not encourage or promote criminal behavior or crimes—which governments do when they legalize advertise 
and promote gambling 20
Legalized gambling has many negative social aspects that make it a disingenuous policy for governments to 
support Aside from the social justice debate that legalized gambling makes poor people poorer simple 
cost benefit analysis shows the financial perils that gambling imposes on a nation One representative analysis 
performed in 1996 indicates that the costs imposed on society are anywhere from two to six times greater than 
any possible benefits that can be gained from legalized gambling activities 21
13 Am Psych Assn Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 615 18 Sec 312 31 (1994) 
[hereinafter DSM IV]
14 Am Med Assoc House of Delegates Resolution 430 (A 94) (1994)
15 Ford Turner Neurochemicals Blamed for Compulsive Gambling 8 COMPULSIVE GAMBLING 1 (1995 1996) (citing article 
m the Union News (Springfield Mass) May 10 1995) (emphasis added)
16 See Harvard Addictions Meta Analysis supra note 12 See e g  Mega Lawsuits supra note 11 at Tables Al A4 
' SMRRes Corp The Personal Bankruptcy Crisis 1997 (1997) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Crisis]
18 Richard I Aaron How Much Does the Rise in Gambling Cause a Rise in Bankruptcy9 7 J  Bankr L & Prac 313 
(1998)
19 For a summary of these costs see Mega Lawsuits supra note 11 at 47 Table A8 & 56 57 U S  and International Costs 
supra note 11 Table 8 The 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission reported that twenty three percent of 
pathological gamblers and thirteen percent of problem gamblers had been incarcerated The thirty two percent of 
pathological gamblers who had been arrested were each calculated to have a lifetime arrest cost of $10 000 Nat L 
gambling Impact Study Comm N Final report 7 14 (1999) available at
http //gov info library unt edu/ngoc/reports/2 dpf [hereinafter NGISC Final Report]
20 See Mega Lawsuits supra note 11 at 47 48 Tables A9 10 57 60 U S and International Costs supra note 11 at 9 10
21 See E  L Grinds & J D Omorov Development or Dreamfield Delusions9 Assessing Casino Gambling s Costs and 
Benefits 16 JL  & COM 49 52 65 (1996) [hereinafter Development or Dreamfield Delusions]
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As President Clinton summarized in his 1998 IMF address Strong government policies [and] sound 
busmess practices are needed to ensure growth into the future 22 Entertaining recommendations of legalized 
gambling will only lead to minimal short term benefits in exchange for significant long term consequences that 
could take years to repair In the developing and often ailing economies of the Pacific Rim and Russia, for 
example policymakers should focus on recommendations that bring new economic expansion through sound 
busmess practices rather than utilize discredited gambling economics to redistribute wealth and create new 
social costs and negative externalities
F The U S -International Interface with Gambling
In 1996 the U S Congress passed the National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act23 establishing a 
nine member commission24 to conduct a comprehensive study of the social and economic impacts of gamblmg 
m the United States 25 Among other things Congress was concerned that the growth of various forms of 
gamblmg could affect mterstate and international matters under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Government 26 Congressional concern stemmed from the rapid expansion in the types of gamblmg available to 
the U S public and from the social costs associated with this expansion The National Gamblmg Impact Study 
Commission (NGISC or 1999 U S Gamblmg Commission) concluded that gamblmg is not merely a business 
like any other and that it should remain carefully regulated 27 There was however dissent among the 
commissioners as to how much regulation was necessary Notably several Commissioners represented the 
gamblmg industry but despite the gamblmg industry s influence some of the Commissioners found that the 
evidence weighed so strongly against the gamblmg industry that it should be prohibited altogether 28 
Notwithstanding the differences of opinion the 1999 U S Gamblmg Commission unanimously agreed that the 
country has gone very far very fast, 29 there should be a pause in the expansion of gamblmg 30 and it should 
perhaps even [be] prohibited 31
This analysis assesses the potential impact of government sanctioned gamblmg and concludes that both 
domestic and international legalized gamblmg activities constitute international economic policy by default, 
which is inimical to U S and international long term economic/legal stability of expectations undermining the 
maintenance of a favorable legal order An economic analysis of legalized gamblmg shows that because 
gamblmg activities addict significant proportions of any given population base it imposes substantial costs on 
society by increasing the mcidence of bankruptcy crune corruption and poverty
In the United States tax revenue deriving from the industry has been insufficient to cover the costs it 
imposes on society 32 For each tax dollar generated from legalized gamblmg during the 1990s U S residents 
incurred three dollars m increased socio economic costs due to bankruptcy crime and corruption 33 The tax rate
22 President William J Clinton Message at the International Monetary Fund/World Bank Annual Meeting (Oct 6 1998) 
[hereinafter Clinton IMF Speech]
23 National Gamblmg Impact Study Commission Act, Pub L No 104 169 104th Cong 2d Sess (1996) codified at 18 
U S C  § 1955 (1994& Supp 1998)
2 Id § 3(a)
25 Id § 4(a)(1)
26 Id § 2(3) (emphasis added)
27 See NGISC Final Report supra note 19 at 1 7
28 See id at 11  App I (Summary Statement by Comm r James C Dobson Ph D )
29 NGISC Final Report supra note 19 at 1 7 
10 Id
" Id
32 See generally John W Kindt, U S  National Security and the Strategic Economic Base The Business/Economic Impacts o f 
the Legalization o f Gambling Activities 39 St LOUIS U L J 567 (1995) [hereinafter Strategic Economic Base] See 
National Gambling Impact & Policy Comm n Act Hearing on H R  497 before the House Comm on the Judiciary 104th 
Cong 1st Sess (1995) [hereinafter Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995]
33 John W Kindt, The Business Economic Impacts o f Licensed Casino Gambling in West Virginia Short Term Gain but 
Long Term Pain 13 W Va U Pub Aff Rep 22 (1996) [hereinafter Business Economic Impacts o f  Gambling] See
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applied to the industry has not been adjusted to accommodate these built in costs making gambling a 
worthwhile investment at the micro economic level only if significant revenue is cannibalized from outside 
the host jurisdiction 34 As the socio economic costs are inevitable legalized gambling constitutes inherently 
deleterious macro economic policy If legalized gambling is allowed to proliferate government sponsored 
gambling destabilizes the global essential of maintaining a favorable legal and economic order This results 
because legalized gambling encourages costly addiction exacerbatmg the occurrence of international criminal 
activities and poverty and further stratifying society Furthermore gambling philosophies cannibalize 
entrepreneurial time and busmess development
Statistics demonstrate that any strategic long term economic plan—for the United States and/or the world 
economy—should not endorse legalized gambling35 Similar to the hypothetical legalization of prohibited drugs 
and the obvious costs the high costs associated with legalized gambling are neither easily nor inexpensively 
mitigated Even if all gambling industry tax revenues were directed at combating the associated increased costs 
in bankruptcies and crime international societies would continue to bear unnecessary and untenable burdens36 
In the United States during the mid 1990s this fact was lost on decision makers which was perhaps explained 
in part by the enormous lobbying power of industry proponents 37
The United States shoulders the international responsibility of structuring its market system to encourage 
economic development and political stability both domestically and abroad With regard to gambling the US 
Congress has only partially met its burden In acknowledgmg its jurisdiction over Internet gambling for 
example and the concomitant mtemational economic concerns tìie U S Congress has to some degree shielded 
the U S public from the potential destabilizing effect of international economic cannibalization via Internet 
gambling Despite this the reluctance of the U S Congress to provide federal regulation has allowed state 
legislatures to create and perpetuate unsound economic policies impacting the country as a whole The 
commerce power of the U S Congress38 easily extends to most domestic legalized gambling activities 
Congress should thus reduce the costly transboundary economic raidmg between states that accompanies 
legalized gambling by asserting its power over this traditionally state dominated area
Furthermore U S and international policymakers should recognize the destabilizing effect legalized 
gambling will have on segments of the global economy as well as the entire international economy Rather than 
institute piecemeal protectionist measures which exacerbate the cannibalistic us against them approach often 
prominent in domestic and foreign policy on the issue policymakers must engage in cooperative efforts to 
ensure the healthy growth of the global economy In part this goal would be accomplished through bilateral and 
multilateral treaties involving friendship commerce and navigation (FCN treaties) to prohibit international 
transboundary economic raiding via government sanctioned gambling activities As an example of one initial 
policy it should be established that the international populace might move to the legalized gambling but the 
gambling should not be allowed to move to the gambler across national boundaries—thus prohibiting Internet 
gambling
generally The National Impact o f  Casino Gambling Proliferation Hearing Before the House Comm on Small Business 
103d Cong 2d Sess (1994) [hereinafter Congressional Gambling Hearing 1994]
3 See generally John W Kindt, Legalized Gambling Activities as Subsidized by Taxpayers 48 Ark L Rev 889(1995) 
[hereinafter Gambling Subsidized]
35 See generally Strategic Economic Base supra note 32
36 See generally Gambling Subsidized supra note 34
37 John W Kindt, Follow the Money Gambling Ethics and Subpoenas 556 ANNALS Am ACADEMY Pol & SOC SCI 85 
85 (1998) [hereinafter Follow the Money]
38 U S CONST art I § 8
Part II
Delimitation of Problems
A The U S Gambling Landscape
Once New Hampshire revived the lottery in 1964 39 gambling became more publicly accepted and widespread 
in the United States As of 1999 thirty seven states and the District of Columbia operated lotteries forty three 
states endorsed pari mutuel wagering on horse races fifteen states permitted pari mutuel wagermg on 
greyhound racing two states allowed sports wagering and twenty eight states permitted casino gambling 40 
Gambling also exists legally or illegally m a number of states m the form of convenience gambling and 
electronic gambling devices (EGDs) such as slot machines video poker and video keno These are often 
placed in public places such as bars truck stops convenience stores restaurants and supermarkets In some 
states private sector businesses are allowed to operate EGDs and m other states EGDs are operated by the 
state lottery In 1982 U S consumers spent $4 2 billion m casinos and $2 2 billion on lottery tickets41 By 
1997 these figures had increased to $27 billion and $16 6 billion respectively 42 By 2000 the gambling 
industry s combined gross revenues were $61 4 billion 43 There was also growing evidence from experts that for 
every one dollar in new legalized gambling there were one to two dollars (or more) m new illegal gambling 44 
While increased legalization and access stimulates the legal gambling market it also grows an illegal shadow 
market that competes by providing (1) better odds (2) better credit (3) better service and (4) a heightened 
sensation factor45
B The Myth of Gambling as Entertainment Gambling as a U S and International Problem
According to Nobel Prize winnmg economist Paul Samuelson46 it is basic economics that
[Gambling] involves simply sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals creatmg 
no new money or goods Although it creates no output gamblmg does nevertheless absorb 
time and resources When pursued beyond the limits of recreation where the mam purpose 
after all is to kill time gamblmg subtracts from the national income 47
Proponents of the gamblmg industry argue that gamblmg is just another form of entertainment—like 
playing a round of golf watching a movie or going to an opera—and as such should be subject to similar 
regulatory standards Critics of the gamblmg industry claim that gamblmg is more analogous to illicit drug use 
than to acceptable forms of national entertainment for one reason in particular—gamblmg like illicit drug use 
imposes enormous costs on society which are not similarly imposed by the entertainment industry Although 
many countries have experienced the destabilizing influence of government sponsored gamblmg only two
39 For a brief history of gambling in the United States see NGISC Final Report supra note 19 at ch 2
40 NGISC Final Report supra note 19 at 2 1 to 2 15
1 Enka Gosker Note The Marketing o f  Gambling to the Elderly 7 Elder L J 185 187 (1999) Patricia Edmonds 
Gamblings Backers Find It Isn t a Sure Bet USA TODAY Dec 29 1995 at Al
2 Gosker supra note 41 at 187 Edmonds supra note 41 at Al
43 Gross Annual supra note 10 at 32
44 Statement and Testimony of William G Hall Exec Dir 111 Econ & Fiscal Comm n before the 111 Legislative Gambling 
Task Force Springfield 111 July 20 1996 see Statement of William G Hall Exec Dir Edward Boss Chief Econ 111 
Econ & Fiscal Comm n Gambling m Illinois Its History Revenue and Future Trends presented to the 111 Legislative 
Gamblmg Task Force Springfield 111 July 20 1996 Gamblmg critics indicated that the senes of socio economic negatives 
reported in the senatim 1996 heanngs of the Illinois Legislative Task Force on Gamblmg were so embarrassing to gamblmg 
proponents that those public heanngs were never printed for dissemination to the public and press
5 Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995 supra note 32 at 60 98
46 Paul Samuelson won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science m 1970
47 Paul A Samuelson Economics 425 (10th ed 1976) (emphasis added)
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countries have in some measure quantified its costs the United States and Australia As Professor Earl Grinols48 
summarized the basic economic principle [t]hese costs are quite high and quite real 49
1 Government Sponsored Gambling as Creating New Pathological (Addicted) and Problem Gamblers, New 
Bankruptcies, New Crime and New Corruption
a Addiction
It is significant to reiterate that as Associate Professor Howard Shaffer of the Harvard Division on Addictions 
has concluded Gamblmg is an addictive behavior make no mistake about it Gambling has all the 
properties of a psychoactive substance and agam the reason is that it changes the neurochemistry of the 
bram 50 Accordmg to Henry Lesieur Professor Emeritus and President of the Institute on Problem Gamblmg 
between five and six percent of the U S population has a gamblmg problem 51 This classification includes both 
pathological and problem gamblers Pathological gambling is recognized in the APA s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders52 as a type of addictive behavior 53 The APA describes the essential 
feature of pathological gamblmg as the persistent and maladaptive gamblmg behavior that disrupts personal 
family or vocational pursuits 54 Accordmg to the APA a pathological gambler
May be preoccupied with gamblmg (e g reliving past gamblmg experiences planning the 
next gamblmg venture or thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble Most 
[pathological gamblers] say that they are seeking action (an aroused euphoric state) even 
more than money Increasingly larger bets or greater risks may be needed to continue to 
produce the desired level of excitement [Pathological gamblers] often contmue to gamble 
despite repeated efforts to control cut back or stop the behavior A pattern of chasmg 
one s losses may develop with an urgent need to keep gamblmg (often with larger bets or the 
taking of greater risks) to undo a loss or series of losses The individual may lie to family 
members therapists or others to conceal the extent of mvolvement with gamblmg When the 
individual s borrowing resources are strained the person may resort to antisocial behavior 
(e g forgery fraud theft or embezzlement) to obtain money55
A study financed by the gamblmg industry itself showed that one half percent56 or 1 5 million people57 of 
the U S population became new pathological gamblers between 1994 and 1997 and that two percent of the 
U S population 58 or 3 5 million people became new problem gamblers during the same period 59 Statistics
48 Earl Gnnols is a Professor o f Economics at the University o f Illinois at Urbana Champaign
49 Earl L Grinds Gambling as Economic Policy Enumerating Why Losses Exceed Gams ILL Bus Rev 6(1995)
“ Turner supra note 15 at 1
51 M Neil Browne The Role o f  Ethics in Regulatory Discourse Can Market Failure Justify the Regulation o f  Casino 
Gaming? 6N eb L Rev 37 48(1999)
52 DSM IV supra note 13 at 615 18
53 Technically pathological gambling was classified as an impulse control disorder but until gambling mdustiy research 
monies intervened the academic trend was toward classifying pathological gambling as an addiction Compare Turner 
supra note 15 at 1 with David Ferrell & Matea Gold Casino Industry Fights an Emerging Backlash L A  Times Dec 14 
1998 at Al
5 DSM IV supra note 13 at 278
55 Id at 278 79
56 Harvard Addictions Meta Analysis supra note 12 at 43 Table 13
57 Multiplying the prevalence percentage for 1997 with the yearly population number from the U S Bureau o f the Census 
yields 3 5 million for an increase of 1 3 million new pathological gamblers However the Harvard Addictions
Meta Analysis concludes that there were 4 4 million pathological gamblers in 1997 which would yield 1 3 million to 2 2 
million new pathological gamblers Since the Harvard Addictions Meta Analysis did not include its calculations 1 5 million 
new pathological gamblers is a conservative figure Harvard Addictions Meta Analysis supra note 12 at 41 Table 13 & 51 
Table 16
58 See supra notes 56 57 and accompanying text
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show that the comparable pathological and problem gambling rates among teens were double those of the U S 
adult population 60 and furthermore the elderly were particularly vulnerable to the lures of gambling 61 
Considering that these results were revealed often by industry financed studies these numbers were particularly 
alarming
b Bankruptcy
A conservative estimate shows that between 1994 and 1997 approximately twenty percent of new pathological 
gamblers m the United States filed for personal bankruptcy 62 at an average cost of $29 650 63 The total cost to 
society64 of these new bankruptcies conservatively totaled $9 billion 65 Problem gamblers suffered much the 
same fate as pathological gamblers Between 1994 and 1997 the bankruptcies of problem gamblers cost society 
approximately $30 billion 66 Taken together the United States absorbed approximately $40 billion in new 
bankruptcy costs from 1994 to 1997 directly attributable to the legalization of gambling 67
c Crime Costs of Pathological (Addicted) and Problem Gamblers
The speed with which legalized gambling spread throughout the United States m the 1990s and the limited 
sources of funding available to study its impact prevented the production of many necessary impact studies 
Despite a dearth of crime statistics authoritative information suggests that the mcidence of gambling related 
crime is substantial In its analysis of the economic and social cost impact of gambling a comprehensive 1994 
report by the Florida Governor s Office established a correlation between the legalization of casmos and the 
crime costs to society Specifically the report found that each new pathological gambler costs a state $1 624 for 
probation related expenses $858 for community control related expenses $19 987 in incarceration related 
expenses and $363 in post secondary release supervision related expenses 68
According to the Compulsive Gambling Center m Baltimore Maryland virtually all pathological gamblers 
commit crimes but generally seventy five percent of pathological gamblers are not caught or the criminal 
charges are dropped 69 Some gamblers steal—from employers insurance companies family members and close 
associates—to repay their debts or to feed their gamblmg habits 70 Other gamblers resort to prostitution or drug
59 Multiplying the prevalence percentage for 1997 with the yearly population number from the U S Bureau o f the Census 
yields 13 million for an increase of 5 4 million new problem gamblers However the Harvard Addictions Meta Analysis 
concludes that there were 11 million problem gamblers in 1997 which would yield 3 4 million to 5 4 million new problem 
gamblers Since the Harvard Addictions Meta Analysis did not include its calculations 3 5 million new problem gamblers is 
a conservative figure Harvard Addictions Meta Analysis supra note 12 at 43 Table 13 & 51 Table 16 
“  As of 1997 there were 7 9 million pathological and problem gamblers between the ages of 10 and 19 and 7 5 million 
pathological and problem gamblers age 20 and older U S and International Costs supra note 11 figure 5 table 10
61 Gosker supra note 41 at 195
62 Bankruptcy Crisis supra note \1  at 118 (commissioned by the bankmg/credit community Am Bankers Assn) 
Business Wire New National Study Shows Correlation Between Gambling Growth and the Significant Rise in Personal 
Bankruptcies Business Wire Features June 27 1997
3 See generally Bankruptcy Crisis supra note 17 at 116 30
64 See id These costs are passed along to customers See id at 118
65 Id at 123 24 Much higher costs can be extrapolated from the projections m WEFA Group The Financial Cost o f  
Personal Bankruptcies at 1 15 19 (Feb 1998)
“  See generally Bankruptcy Crisis supra note 17 (concluding m 1997 that legalized gamblmg (1) was the fourth leading 
cause of bankruptcies (2) was the fastest growmg cause (3) carried a hidden cost per household o f $408 and (4) earned a 
U S total of $40 billion a year)
67 Id
“ Fla Gov Off Casinos in Florida An Analysis of the Economic and Social Impacts 72 (1994)
69 Interview with Dr Valene Lorenz, Exec Dir Compulsive Gamblmg Ctr Inc Baltimore Md (Dec 10 1992) See e g  
Mega Lawsuits supra note 11 at 46-47 Tables A6 8 56 57
70 Id
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dealmg 71 In an extreme example of what criminal acts can follow from gambling addiction one Illinois mother 
allegedly killed her two children m separate incidents and was imprisoned for trying to collect $200 000 of their 
insurance money so she could continue to gamble 72
Two thirds of pathological gambling debtors contemplate suicide 73 For example the coroner s office 
linked several suicides m the Joliet Illinois area to losses suffered at local casinos including a husband wife 
double suicide 74 Such a scenario can develop quickly as exemplified by a long tune police officer whose 
accumulated gambling losses led him to commit suicide m a Detroit casino shortly after it opened in 1999 75
By 2000 the economic and social disruption in the United States caused by pathological and problem 
gambling was extensive Extrapolated to the entire community of potential new pathological gamblers in the 
United States the unadjusted (and thus more conservative) cost in 1997 with respect to identified expenses 
totaled approximately $34 2 billion 76 When these statistical trends were extrapolated to any potentially 
saturated gambling economy particularly in developmg countries these statistics suggested significant social 
disruption
d Organized Crime
Gambling has traditionally been associated with organized criminal activities 77 but stringent industry regulation 
m the United States has largely discouraged although not eliminated organized crime influences However 
other countries without substantial and stronger law enforcement mechanisms have not managed to curb such 
abuses For example historically legalized gambling venues were rife with money laundering activities often 
linked to organized crime 78 If the stringent U S law enforcement mechanisms have not eliminated all 
influences from organized crime a fortiori the governmental authorities and economies of those countries 
lacking efficient law enforcement infrastructures are at significant risk In his statement before the U S 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Russian General Mikhail Yegerov cited gambling as one of the 
interests (along with money laundermg illegal money transactions prostitution and drug related industries) of
71 Vanessa Hua, Asian American Trend Reflected in Crime Breakdown o f  Families LA  TIMES Dec 15 1998 atA47
72 Cam Simpson Baby Death Plot Told Suburb Mom Indicted in Insurance Scheme CHI SUN TIMES Mar 7 1998 at 1 2
73 See Study Links Suicide Increase to Gambling N Y  Times Dec 16 1997 http//webservl startnbune com/cgi 
bin/stOnLine/article9thisSlug=suicl6 For the complete study see David P Phillips Ward Welty & Mansa M Smith 
Elevated Suicide Levels Associated with Legalized Gambling 27 Suicide & Life Threatening Behav 373 (1997) See 
Press Release U of Cal San Diego Increase m Legalized Gambling Is Linked to Higher Suicide Rates m UCSD Study 
(Dec 15 1997) Shaun McKinnon Study Links Gambling Suicide Las Vegas Rev J Dec 15 1997 at BÍ See generally 
Sandra Blakeslee Suicide Rate Is Higher in Three Gambling Cities Study Shows as Betting Rises in U S  N Y  Times Dec 
16 1997 at A10 See also Stephen Braun Lives Lost in a River o f  Debt L A  Times June 22 1997 at Al This extensive 
article reports how coroner s subpoenas had to be issued to Illinois casinos to discover the $100 000s of dollars lost 
gambling by several suicides and these problems were not reported as such in the local news until after this article was 
pnnted on page one of the L A Times See id See generally Art Nadler Nevada Suicide Rate No 1 m U S  Las Vegas 
Sun Aug 29 1997
74 Braun supra note 73 at Al
75 Jim Suhr Officer Kills Himself in Casino after Losing at Blackjack Table St J Reg (Springfield 111) Jan 28 2000 at 
3
76 See supra note 57 and accompanying text
77 See e g  Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995 supra note 32 (sworn testimony of former organized crime member 
William Jahoda)
78 See Edict in Turkey Closes Casinos in Anti Crime Move Chi Trib Feb 12 1998 §1 at 16 [hereinafter Edict in Turkey 
Closes Casinos] Darren Butler Casino Industry Nears Final Days in Turkey St LOUIS POST Dispatch Feb 4 1998 at 
A8 Frank Walker Casino s Elite Bet Millions but Lived in Squats Sun Herald (Austl ) May 7 2000 available at 2000 
WL 6351932 ForU S concerns on casinos and money laundering seeU S Gen l Accounting Off Money 
Laundering Rapid Growth of Casinos Makes Them Vulnerable (1996) [hereinafter GAO Report] Assoc Press 
Wash DC Bur U S Allies Want Crackdown on Money Laundering l u n d i  2001
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the twenty four Russian organized crime groups operating m the United States 79 Furthermore there is growing 
evidence that for every dollar m new legalized gambling activities there are at least one to two dollars m new 
illegal gambling 80 paving the way for mcreased avenues of operation for the type of international organized 
crime groups described by General Yegerov
2 Why Governments Legalize Gambling
a Illusory Promises
Historically gambling representatives repeatedly described gambling as a tool for economic development that 
created new jobs for depressed regional economies81 and proponents of gambling argued for its legalization by 
promising new tax revenues for various government units struggling to find funding 82 Studies demonstrated 
that these promises were generally illusory promises 83 A basic concept usually ignored m gambling financed 
studies was the utilization of valid before and after data because such studies almost invariably reflected 
unfavorably on gambling activities
Accordingly a 1996 analysis of Illinois employment statistics taken before and after the widespread 
legalization of casmo gambling confirmed that little if any growth was directly attributable to the new 
industry 84 Because gambling transferred money from one local pocket to another and from one local sector to 
another [gambling did] not lead to a net increase in regional demand 85 A given area could realize growth 
only when it attracted buyers from outside the area, thus enlarging the local economy 86 Secondly assuming that 
a gambling establishment did attract buyers from outside the area usually designated as the thirty five mile or 
100 mile feeder markets the host area would subsequently realize growth only if the revenue generated from 
the outside buyers was spent in the host jurisdiction 87 Thirdly a host area would realize net employment 
growth only when the gambling establishment s employees lived in the host area at the time legalization was
79 Hearing on Int l Crime and its Impact on the United States Before the Permanent Subcomm on Investigations o f the 
Senate Comm on Gov t Affairs 103rd Cong 76 (1994) (prepared statement of General Mikhail K Yegerov)
80 See supra note 44 and accompanying text
81 Robert Goodman Legalized Gambling as a Strategy for Economic Development 16 18 (Ctr Econ Dev U 
Mass Amherst 1994) [hereinafter CED Report] Congressional Gambling Hearing 1994 supra note 33 (testimony of Prof 
Robert Goodman U Mass ) Paul Glastns & Andrew Bates The Fool s Gold in Gambling States Learn How Hard It Is to 
Control Gambling U S News & WORLD Rep Apr 1 1991 at 22 Development or Dreamfield Delusions supra note 21 at 
49 66
82 For a specific industry proposal which involves land based casino style gambling in Chicago see Chicago Gaming 
Comm n Economic and Other Impacts of a Proposed Gaming Entertainment and Hotel Facility (May 19 1992) 
(report prepared by Deloitte & Touche Chicago 111) The new tax revenue projections were substantial Id at 270 71 
However several problems involving these calculations meant that there were substantial public misperceptions about the 
new tax revenues to be generated by the projected casino complex in Chicago John W Kindt, The Economic Impacts o f  
Legalized Gambling Activities 43 Drake L Rev 51 55 56 nn 28 43 (1984) [hereinafter Economic Impacts] These 
problems were also identified in analyses by several Illinois government units For a summary of these problems see Press 
Release Off 111 Gov James Edgar Governor Wams Land Based Casinos Could Bring Crime Surge as well as Overall Loss 
of Jobs and State Revenues (Sept 29 1992) See also Earl Gnnols As Revenue Producer Gambling Is Bad Debt Chi Sun 
Times Dec 7 1991 at 18 See generally MarkE Stover Revenue Potential o f  State Lotteries 15 PUB FIN Q 428(1987) 
For an analysis o f taxation in the context of casmo gambling see Maiy O Borg et al The Incidence o f  Taxes on Casino 
Gambling 50 Am J Econ & Soc 323 (1991)
83 See generally Development or Dreamfield Delusions supra note 21 at 49
84 Id at 80 
a Id 
KId
87 Id (finding that [c]asinos that attract large flows of external revenues but remove equally large flows do not enhance the 
local economy )
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considered and then continued to do so 88 The minimal employment effect m Illinois suggested that one or more 
of these requirements were not met in most situations89 and that the promises made by the industry fell far short 
of meetmg expectations Even if all of the positive factors were present and the host area realized economic 
development from the presence of legalized gambling it was usually in the temporary form of a boom and 
bust cycle
The boom and bust phenomenon is due largely to the cannibalistic nature of gambling Smce the 
gambling industry is not taxed sufficiently to cover the social costs it imposes on society 90 a gambling economy 
is not economically beneficial to a local area unless it can draw sufficient revenue from bettors outside the tax 
jurisdiction to counter the social costs mherent in gambling activities Neighboring feeder market jurisdictions 
are thereby pressured to reclaim their lost revenue base legalize gambling and begin a race to the bottom that 
often leads to economic failure These failures
Underscore the economic cannibalism that looms ahead as casinos proliferate Casinos thrive 
as long as they lure out of towners But once the wagering visitors get then- own casino back 
home the locals tend to be left holding the bag This boom and bust pattern is pandemic 
reports William R Eadmgton an economist, who heads the University of Nevada s Institute 
for the Study of Gambling and Commercial Gaming in Reno In place after place he says a 
cas mo based economy first soars but then slumps into a black hole 91
The town of Gardena California constituted a microcosmic example of this phenomenon In the mid 20th 
century Gardena, California brought in more money from gambling than any other city in the state 92 Tax 
revenue from its six prosperous card rooms financed virtually every aspect of the city s operations from its 
police to its parks 93 When California passed Proposition 13—a tax limitation initiative that sank many towns 
into debt 94—many cities turned to poker clubs to make up for lost revenues 95 usurping Gardena s virtual 
monopoly over local card clubs By 1998 there was only one card room left m Gardena and more importantly 
storefronts were closed with no major shoppmg centers or fine restaurants left anywhere m the city 96 Tom 
Parks who ran two of the card clubs noted A lot of surrounding businesses are gone now 97 There was 
insufficient diversity in Gardena s economic base to allow it to withstand the loss of poker room revenue 98 As 
Richard K Propster the former police chief in Gardena, summarized There were stories for years about Sears 
Roebuck lookmg for a site in this area and not choosing Gardena at least partially because [of the card 
rooms] 99 Tom Parks described the psychological impact of this boom and bust phenomenon I don t think 
people really realized how dependent they were on the [card] clubs until they started closing up 100 In an 
economic irony reminiscent of the Twilight Zone by 1998 Gardena appeared doomed to repeat and intensify 
this same tragic scenario In 1998 Gardena was millions of dollars in debt and looking to a proposal by Larry 
Flint the avant garde magazine mogul to build a two story $30 million card room with a companion sports bar 
and restaurant101
88 See generally Development or Dreamfield Delusions supra note 21 at 49 
n Id
90 See generally Gambling Subsidized supra note 34 Development or Dreamfield Delusions supra note 21 at 49 U S  and 
International Costs supra note 11
91 Heilman Casino Craze Travel Holiday Mar 1994 at 86 (citing to Prof William Eadmgton U Nev Reno) (emphasis 
added)
92 David Ferrell Gardena s Changing Fortunes Living by Casinos Losing by Casinos L A  Times Dec 14 1998 atA6
93 Id 
9 Id
95 Id See also Ferrell & Gold supra note 53 at Al
96 Ferrell supra note 92
97 Id 
98Id 
99Id
100 Id
101 Ferrell supra note 92
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b Industry Pressure and Political Influence
Industry potential for economic reward is enormous Arguably the enormous profit margins inherent m 
legalized gambling activities can be attributable to gambling s addictive character A disproportionate 
percentage of the gambling industry s revenue comes from pathological and problem gamblers whose 
entertainment5 transforms to compromise and eventually destroy their economic and social stability Despite 
the extent to which society at large is financially burdened by legalized gambling decisionmakers mistakenly 
afford the industry the luxury of avoidmg internalizing the costs of gambling s negative externalities and of 
operatmg under the same tax structure as less costly industries Furthermore legalized gamblmg is inherently 
monopolistic with regard to the rest of the economy Because the nature of gambling requires government 
oversight and restriction (the limitation of competition) it is an industry that offers artificially high profits for 
the few fortunate enough to be licensed 102 For example one Illinois riverboat resulted in a reported tripling of 
the origmal $7 million investment after the casino was in busmess for only six months 103 Professor Grinols 
observed that [t]his kmd of profit drives others to seek to expand gambling for their own profit 104
The success of industry expansion efforts in the United States has derived from ‘the extraordinary amount 
of money legally used to overwhelm any opposition 105 m both the political and the academic arenas One 
way m which the gambling industry used its economic strength to overwhelm its competitors was by 
subsidizing its own body of data that was effectively unreviewable by the larger academic community 106 As 
noted expert Professor Henry Lesieur concluded research funded by the industry [was] going to dominate the 
dialogue 107 for the early years of the 21 st century
Another equally problematic aspect of casino interest money could be found m its lobbying power 
Pro gambling interests became the 1990s single most powerful lobbying group in many individual state 
legislatures 108 In Illinois for example one casino company offered $20 million to two political insiders to help 
secure a casino license 109 In 1995 in Virginia—a state with only some charitable gamblmg and a recently 
enacted lottery—casmo proponents hired forty eight lobbyists who represented practically every lobbying firm 
in Richmond in an attempt to prohibit any anti gamblmg lobbyists from competing The pro casmo interests 
then spent between $820 000 and $1 1 million durmg a forty five day legislative session in a failed attempt to 
legalize riverboat casinos 110 As reported by the Center for Responsive Politics and the National Coalition 
Against Legalized Gamblmg (NCALG) data released by the Federal Election Commission revealed that by the 
end of the 1996 election cycle contributions to federal candidates totaled $5 4 million including $3 6 million m 
soft money This was a 700% increase over the $457 600 contributed m 1991-92 111 Interestingly both the 
Democrats and the Republicans were receivmg similarly large amounts from the gamblmg industry 112 although 
sometimes from different gamblmg industry constituencies
In congressional hearings before the U S Committee on the Judiciary Representative Frank R Wolf 
voiced his concern that the flood of casmo money mto the states [would] drown out the voices of ordinary 
citizens and overwhelm state public officials 113 Incidents m various states suggested that these concerns were
102 Gnnols supra note 49
103 Id (citing Cm Sun Times Apr 18 1994) 
m Id
05 Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995 supra note 32 at 520
106 Ferrell & Gold supra note 53
107 Id
108 CED Report supra note 81 at 190
109 Jim Drmkard Gamblmg Uses Big Money to Woo States NewsTrib (Jefferson City M o) Feb 25 1996
110 Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995 supra note 32 at 19 Rick Snider Riverboat Hobbyists Spend Record in 
Virginia The Blood Horse July 22 1995 at 3336
111 Bemie Horn Gambling Interests Spent over $3 6 Million on Soft Money to Buy Political Influence with the National 
Parties Press Release National Coalition Against Legalized Gamblmg (Mar 20 1997) (on file with author)
112 Federal Election Commission Data, as compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics and the National Coalition Against 
Legalized Gamblmg (1997)
113 Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995 supra note 32 at 19
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well founded 114 In 1998 in California alone gambling proponents contributed over $100 million to
pro gambling campaigns and political interests 115 A review of parallel problems in several states has disclosed
a pattern of gambling industry abuses of the political process
u Iowa
In Waterloo Iowa voters rejected casino gambling on May 17 1994 The gamblmg interests were powerful 
enough that the issue was placed on the ballot agam only four months later on September 27 1994 1,6 The 
gambling industry spent $40 for each dollar spent by its opponents yet the initiative failed 117
it Florida
In 1994 the gamblmg industry spent over $16 5 million approximately $10 for each dollar spent by its 
opponents in their attempt to convince Florida voters to open their $32 billion tourist market to the casmo 
industry 118 This $16 5 million was more than the combmed totals spent in the 1994 gubernatorial campaigns of 
then Governor Lawton Chiles and future Governor Jeb Bush Florida voters voted against casino gamblmg in 
1994 this tune by a margin of over two to one 119
ul Missouri
In Missouri pro gamblmg forces were able to place the issue on the ballot m November of 1994—only a few 
months after Missourians had voted against casmo gamblmg in April By increasing its November 
pro gamblmg campaign expenditures to $10 million a ratio of $78 to $1 (almost doubling its expenditures from 
the April election) the pro gamblmg mterests won 120
Nat Helms a former high ranking member of the gamblmg industry s 1994 campaign to brmg video 
gambling machines to Missouri emphasized the buy the opposition strategy of pro gamblmg mterests 
Because of the unlimited money it generates gamblmg also generates unlimited potential for abuse I have 
never met anybody who could resist a full court press by the gamblmg industry 121
IV Arkansas
In 2000 Arkansas was faced with Amendment 5 a proposed constitutional amendment that would grant 
permission for casmos to be built m six Arkansas counties122 despite the defeat of a similar 1995 proposal 
Although a poll showed that fifty one percent of the public in 2000 was against Amendment 5 Democratic 
Party and pro gamblmg operative Glen Hooks stated I intend to run an intensive media campaign and an 
extensive grassroots campaign over the next 32 days We re going to be at every festival at every block 
party on the air with TV and radio 123
114 See e g  GAO Report supra note 78
1,5 See e g  NGISC Final Report supra note 19 (summary statement by Comm r James C Dobson Ph D )
116 Grinds supra note 49 at 9
1,7 Id
m Id
"9Id
130 Id
121 Dnnkard supra note 109
122 James Jefferson Casino Group Plans Campaign in Face o f  Poor Results AP Newswires Oct 5 2000 available at WL 
Allnews Database 10/5/00 AP WIRES 18 41 00
m ld
Destructive Economic Policies in the Aee o f  Terrorism 15
On the national level gambling opponents posited that as early as 1996 the formation of the National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission was subjected to the beginnings of similar pressures when the American 
Gaming Association spent $860 000 on federal lobbying 124
3 International Case Examples o f Gambling Economies
a Public Understanding of Gambling Impacts by Visualizing the “Island Economy”
For the public to understand the cost/benefit impacts of a gambling economy it is often helpful to visualize 
casino gamblmg at the center of a thirty five mile radius designated the thirty five mile feeder market 
Visualizing an island with a limited radius which introduces casmo gamblmg to the center of its island economy 
further simplifies the understanding that casmo gamblmg merely cannibalizes its own citizens—even when 
island visitors can be enticed to bypass the water boundaries surrounding the island In 2001 it was postulated 
that Hawaii for example would serve as a good before and after economic petridish if legalized gamblmg 
was ever introduced to the Honolulu area However policymakers m Hawaii and non island economies as well 
would be better served to examine the impacts of legal and illegal gamblmg on the island of Macau
b Macau The Practical Example of the “Island Economy”
Light Draws Mosquitoes Casinos Draw Triads125
One by one the judge read out their names and verdicts Fat Woman Scarface Queen of 
Smuggling And the notorious Broken Tooth sentenced to 15 years as the boss of the 14K 
triad As part of a 10 000 strong underground society these characters lorded over this 
territory for years presiding over its nine casinos and engaging in crimes such as money 
laundering loan sharking and drug smugglmg 126
This is some of the 1999 news from Macau a small picturesque island off the coast of mainland Chma It 
encompasses a mere nine and one fifth miles and has a population of less than half a million The island is best 
known for its casmo industry headed by Stanley Ho who was granted a monopoly license over the industry in 
1962 127 His license was scheduled to expire on December 31 2001 128
As a small island with little economic diversity Macau exemplifies a type of economic petn dish for 
analyzing and visualizing the socioeconomic impacts of gamblmg activities In 1996 gamblmg accounted for 
approximately thirty percent of Macau s gross domestic product and gamblmg taxes accounted for about half 
of Macau s total government revenues The island is governed by corruption and crime By 1998 with profits 
waning in the face of competition from gamblmg resorts in South Korea the Philippines and Malaysia and 
with the pending expiration of Stanley Ho s license gang factions began jockeying for control over Macau s 
gamblmg industry 129 In 1998 there were thirty seven people killed in mostly gang related homicides The list 
of those killed in Macau since 1996 included the gamblmg mspector the marine police chief the chauffeur for 
the undersecretary of security and members of the 14K gang who were hacked to death by hit men for the rival 
Rolex gang 130 The list of those targeted but not killed on the island in the same period included Police Chief
1:4 Bemie Horn The American Gaming Association Paid Outside Lobbyists $232 000 to Stack the Federal Gambling Study 
Commission Press Release of National Coalition Agamst Legalized Gamblmg Mar 18 1997
125 Bay Fang China Embraces a Speck Called Macau U S  News & World Rep Dec 20 1999 at 40 [hereinafter Fang]
126 Id
127 Kao Chen Open Warfare Erupts as Handover Looms in Macau The Straits Times (Singapore) Feb 7 1999 
m ld
m ld
130 Fang supra note 125 at 40
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Antonio Batista, whose car was blown up and five police officers 131 The bomb that injured the five police 
officers also injured ten journalists 132
The island obviously suffers from a lack of regulatory oversight No measures were in place to stop the 
transfer when Zhang Xiaoming former manager of a state owned Chinese company funneled $850 000 m 
public funds through a Macau trading company and into the Macau branch of the Bank of China Within five 
months he lost all the money gambling in Macau s casmos He was executed in 1991 133 Joao Severino then 
editor of the territory s Portuguese language daily stated that ‘the administration has lost control and the triad 
knows it 134 Macau legislator Antonio Ng confirmed this conclusion and stated we cannot control the situation 
because our policemen are still influenced by criminal members 135
c Australia
Australia has the highest per capita mcidence of gambling m the world with more than eighty percent of its 
population placing bets 136 With at least one casino in every major city by 1999 Australia s gambling market 
was virtually saturated 137 In 1999 the Australian government released a report from the Productivity 
Commission Inquiry regarding the Study of the Gambling Industry 138 The findings included in the report 
emphasized the enormity of the problems Australia faced because of its government s commitments to the 
legalized gambling industry
Approximately one percent of the Australian population were delimited as having severe problems with 
gambling 139 while another two and one tenth percent of the population had sigmficanf problems with 
gambling 140 and yet another six and three tenth percent of the population had some problem with gambling 141 
Of the total Australian problem gamblers it was estimated that approximately fifty percent committed criminal 
offenses to support their gambling 142 In Australia problem gamblers accounted for fifteen percent of regular 
gamblers and contributed between thirty five and thirty nine percent of all gambling revenue 143 The annual 
losses for a problem gambler averaged $12 000 and between seven and eight (7 3) people were adversely 
affected by each problem gambler 144 Children whose parents had a problem with gambling were more likely to 
develop problems themselves 145 and the most immediate concern for children s welfare m problem gambling 
households was poverty and the resultmg deprivation of life s essentials including food 146 By 1999 
Australians were losing $7 25 billion a year to gamblmg nearly twice the amount they spent on power and fuel 
combined 147
The report found that approximately seventy percent of Australians consider that gambling does more harm 
than good to the community 148 Reacting to the Productivity Commission s findings Prime Minister John
131 See id 
m ld
133 Manager Executed Over Gambling Losses SF  CHRON Apr 21 1992 atA8 available at 1992 WL 6257161 
13 Chen supra note 127
135 Id
136 Christopher Zinn Australians Are Biggest Gamblers Cm SUN TIMES July 29 1999 at 30
137 Australians Love to Wager but Critics Decry Social Costs ROANOKE TIMES (Va ) Mar 9 1998 atA8
138 Productivity Comm n Australia s Gambling Industries Final Report Summary (Nov 1999) [hereinafter 
Productivity Comm n Report]
139 Id §6 44 
m Id
141 Id § 6 46
142 Id § 7 36
143 Productivity Comm n Report supra note 138 § 3 8b
144 Id §7 34
145 Id § 7 36
146 Id §7 31
l47Zinn supra note 136 at 30
148 Productivity Comm n Report supra note 138 § 9 19
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Howard said [T]his is an achievement of which I am ashamed I would like the federal and state 
governments to get together and see if there aren t intelligent things we can do to curb the abuse 149 Despite the 
known hazards of gambling and in the wake of the Productivity Commission s report, Australian authorities 
continued to expand casino capacity 150 a government addicted trend which further destabilized the long term 
Australian economy with economic ripple effects poised to injure other countries invested in the Australian 
economy
19 Zinn supra note 136 at 30
150 Steward Oldfjeld Push for New Casino Games AUSTL FIN Rev Oct 5 2000 at 14 available at 2000 WL 26258017
Part III
Clarification of Goals
A Strategic Economic Goals and the U N System
Political economic history demonstrates that any industry or combination of industries powerful enough to 
dommate an economy and the government s economic policies will destabilize that economy to promote the 
industry itself and thereby usually precipitate a boom and bust phenomenon 151 Economic history as well as 
basic statistics suggest that because of inflated profit margins coupled with its sterile need for continued 
expansion the gambling industry is powerful enough to effect such eventual destabilization in any national 
economy Indeed academic research suggests that legalized gambling can easily catalyze the collapse of the 
economies of less developed countries—due m part to then lack of safeguards and infrastructure 152 The 
economic experiences of Gardena, California and Macau provide microcosmic examples of this destructive 
process
The overall strategic goals for government should be to conform to the common law principle of 
maximizing the public health safety and welfare of its citizens and to forge a common vision of 
international cooperation m the mterest of the global good The U S obligation to the United Nations (U N ) 
exemplifies its commitment to this end Article 55 of the U N Charter reads
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self determination of peoples the United Nations shall promote
[H]igher standards of living full employment and conditions of economic and social progress 
and development solutions of international economic social health and related problems 
and international cultural and educational cooperation 153
B International Economic Goals and the World Bank Group
In the 1970s the World Bank Group s policies involving the granting of loans began to be influenced by 
externalities other than just financial considerations Specifically attention was directed to the environmental 
impacts created by development projects underwritten by the World Bank Group 154
The World Bank Group consisted of the World Bank (Bank) itself formally designated as the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its two affiliates the International Development 
Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC)155 Parallel with the establishment of the
151 See e g  Follow the Money supra note 37 at 91
152 U S and International Costs supra note 11 at 21
153 UN Charter art 55
154 John W Kindt, Note Providing fo r Environmental Safeguards in the Development Loans Given by the World Bank to the 
Developing Countries 5 Ga J INT L & COMP L 540 544 (1975) [hereinafter World Bank to the Developing Countries]
155 See Articles of Agreement o f the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 60 Stat 1440 (1946) T I A S  
No 1502 2 U N T S  134 (entered into force Dec 27 1945) Articles of Agreement of the International Development 
Association 1 1 U S T  2284 T I A S  No 4607 439 U N  T S 249 (entered into force Sept 24 1960) Articles of 
Agreement of the International Finance Corporation 7 U S T  2197 T I A S  No 3620 2 6 4 U N T S  117 (entered into force 
July 20 1956) W Friedman G Kalmanoff & R  Meagher International Financial Aid 90 112(1966) E Mason 
& R Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods 21 27 (1973) See also Agreement Establishing the Inter American 
Development Bank 1 0 U S T  3029 T I A S  No 4397 3 8 9 U N T S  69 (entered into force Dec 30 1959)
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) 156 the World Bank Group was created during the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference to address the international financial problems incident to World War II and its aftermath The 
purpose of the IMF was to finance temporary balance of payments deficits while the Bank was to provide 
long term finance for the reconstruction of economies damaged by the war and for the development of the less 
developed countries (LDCs) Thus the IMF dealt with problems of international liquidity and short term credit 
while the Bank handled the flow of long term capital for mvestment purposes across national boundaries
Initially the Bank s lending policy was governed by two conditions The loan had to be for a specific 
project and the Bank could only finance the foreign exchange component of the project The Bank s charter 
specified that loans had to be (a) made for specific projects (except in special circumstances ) (b) made for 
productive purposes (c) guaranteed by the government concerned (d) granted without prejudice as to country 
(e) made only if there exist reasonable prospects for repayment and (f) granted only if there is no other 
available source 157
However by the 1970s the Bank had liberalized its project approach and began funding many different 
types of stabilization programs within the LDCs The delegates at Bretton Woods initially envisioned the Bank 
as operatmg mainly to guarantee loans by private investors rather than making direct loans from its own 
capital138 However from the outset the Bank has emphasized its other purposes as stated in its Articles of 
Agreement, to supplement private mvestment by providmg on suitable conditions finance for productive 
purposes out of its own capital funds raised by it and other resources 159 By the 1970s the Bank was making 
loans to the LDCs in the areas of agriculture industry and transportation
Since the Bank s major resources for lending came from private capital markets it had to fix its terms 
accordingly 160 Consequently the IDA was founded in 1961161 to provide development financing to less 
developed countries on terms more flexible and bearing less heavily on their balance of payments than those of 
the World Bank 162 Only members of the World Bank could join the IDA consequently all members of the 
IDA were members of the Bank Unlike the Bank the IDA received virtually all its funds in the form of 
contributions 163
By lending to governments the IBRD and the IDA were the main avenues for channeling development 
capital to the LDCs however the IFC also contributed by mobilizing private investment Under a provision of 
the Bank s charter loans made by the Bank if not made to governments required a government guarantee and
156 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 60 Stat, 1401 (1946) T I A S  No 1501 2 U N T S  39 
(entered into force Dec 27 1945) (Bretton Woods Conf July 1 22 1944) Ironically Bretton Woods was the situs for a 
2001 conference which included debates on bringing casinos to Bretton Woods
157 World Bank World Bank and IDA 3 (1974)
158 A Cairnacross The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 7 (1959)
159 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, art I 60 Stat 1440 (1946)
T I A S  No 1502 2 U N T S  134 (entered into force Dec 27 1945)
160 See World Bank World Bank and EDA 3 4 (1974)
161 SeeS Rep No 834 93d Cong 2d Sess 1 5 (1974) See also J Weaver The International Development 
Association A New Approach to Foreign Aid 11(1965)
'“ Friedman Kalmanoff & Meagher supra note 155 at 91 Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the International 
Development Association states that
The purposes o f  the Association are to promote economic development increase productivity 
and thus raise standards o f  living m the less developed areas o f  the world included within the 
Association s membership m particular by providmg finance to meet their important 
developmental requirements on terms which are more flexible and bear less heavily on the 
balance o f  payments than those o f  conventional loans thereby furthering the developmental 
objectives o f  the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association art I p a ra l  1 1 U S T  2284 T I A S  No 4607 439 
U N T S 249 (entered into force Sept 24 1960)
163 See eg  S Rep No 834 93d Cong 2d Sess (1974)
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this limited the extent to which the Bank could work with the private sector Therefore the IFC was established 
in 1956 to supplement the Bank s activities by providing risk capital and financing projects m the private sector 
without government guarantees 164
In this context the World Bank Group began m the 1970s to incorporate externalities such as 
environmental issues into its loan policies Specifically the World Bank established an Office of 
Environmental Affairs in 1970 165 This Office reviewed loan applications from the LDCs and decided whether 
or not the project adequately provided for environmental safeguards 166 The Office established guidelines for 
projects m the areas of agriculture industry transportation utilities and public health 167 This was a significant 
procedural development for the World Bank decision making process However durmg the 1980s the World 
Bank s decision making image suffered when for example it became apparent that much of the Brazilian 
deforestation problems could be linked to World Bank loans Regardless of these shortcomings in 
environmental decision making it seemed that these public policy trends provided significant precedent for the 
World Bank to focus on the gambling policies of LDCs before granting loans
Recognizing the potential domino effect* of economic financial instability in any country the United 
States and the World Bank community have spent billions of dollars in loans to support countries with 
economic financial instabilities It is incongruous to spend billions to stabilize a country economically and then 
allow that country to use those monies to destabilize itself by investing in casinos and inviting U S casino 
companies to build in their jurisdictions For example U S and World Bank funds were used to stabilize 
Mexico s faltering economy during the mid 1990s After receiving those funds one of Mexico s prime 
economic so called development strategies was to emulate U S gamblmg policy and invite U S casmos to 
Mexico City From May 13 14 1996 Mexico City was the site of the Mexico Gaming Summit and Conference 
hosted by representatives of several major U S gamblmg companies and designed obviously to influence the 
Tourist Commission of the Mexican Department of Commerce 168 The Mexico Gaming Summit was advertised 
as a joint venture between the U S gamblmg industry s trade magazme International Gaming and Wagering 
Business and Mexico Business magazme which was billed ironically as the leading magazme of the NAFTA 
marketplace 169 However the policies of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)170 were 
designed to promote and grow commerce via free trade whereas gamblmg policies act in contravention of free 
trade and promote sterile transfers of wealth that denigrate destabilize and corrupt the Mexican economy and 
its government
Perhaps ironically m March 2002 the U N Summit on Global Development was convened in Monterrey 
Mexico and compelled the leaders of the World Bank the World Trade Organization [the European Union] 
and the International Monetary Fund gathered together for the first time to address the poor in terms rarely 
associated with high finance 171 President George W Bush his administration and most of the Monterrey 
conferees agree[d] that increased development aid should flow only to deserving nations that [would] spend
164 World Bank to the Developing Countries supra note 154 at 551
165 Id at 544 
166Id
16 Id
168 Advertising Supplement, Int L Gaming & Wagering Bus Apr 1996 
m Id
170 Oct 7 1992 U S Can Mex 3 2 I L M  289 (1993) & 32 IL  M 605 (1993) See generally Earl H Fiy The North 
American Free Trade Agreement US and Canadian Perspectives in IMPLICATIONS OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 
Region 17 18 29 (Joseph A McKinney & M  Rebecca Sharpless eds 1992) George W Grayson The North 
American Free Trade Agreement Regional Community and the New World Order 178 179 182 (Kenneth W 
Thompson ed Umv Press Am 1995) M Jean Anderson Implications o f NAFTA s Extensions to Chile and Other 
Countries—A US View 23 CANADA UNITED STATES L J 227 (1997)
171 Tim Weiner More Entreaties in Monterrey for More Aid to the Poor N Y  TIMES Mar 22 2002 at A10
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the aid wisely 172 As U N Secretary General Kofi Annan summarized There is no use in underwriting 
corrupt regimes built on sand 173
As this analysis shows legalized gambling creates economic financial instabilities creating more demands 
for international relief funds to address emergency situations Furthermore funding jurisdictions that sanction 
legalized gambling would be in most circumstances futile attempts at stabilization Legalized gambling is 
simply contrary to sound mternational monetary policy because of its destabilizing effects 174
The United States is implicated in this global dilemma precisely because of its economic power The spread 
of U S legalized gambling first precipitated and then promoted the acceptance of legalized gambling activities 
by other countries and the United States has developed a substantial export market for gambling technology 
and related services For example as of 1998 G Tech (Gambling Technology) aU  S company founded in 
1981 controlled seventy percent of the worldwide lottery market, running lotteries in twenty nine of the 
thirty eight U S states with lotteries as well as Great Britain and other places 175 Unlike other organizations it 
appeared that gambling organizations were more often stigmatized by scandals and allegations of corruption In 
one well known instance a London jury found that the founder of G Tech committed libel when he denied that 
he had tried to bribe a competitor into not challenging his bid for Britam s lottery busmess 176
The United States sets the global standards for gambling In permitting gambling enterprises to flourish m 
the United States and abroad the United States undermines global socio economic stability in contravention of 
its international obligations By virtue of both its position as world economic leader and its commitment to 
international relief organizations the United States bears the burden of structuring its economy to reflect the 
goals of mternational stability and world order 177 As President Clinton stated in his 1998 IMF address Strong 
government policies [and] sound business practices are needed to ensure growth mto the future Promotmg 
gambling activities both in the United States and abroad stands m direct conflict with these stated goals
m ld
173 Id See also Paul Blustein Bush Shift on Foreign Aid Strengthens U S Position at Summit WASH POST Mar 16 2002 
at A20 Hugh Dellios UN Talks Seek Aid for Poor Chi Trib Mar 22 2002 section 1 at 4
174 See generally Blustein supra note 173 atA20 Dellios supra note 173
175 Brett Pulley Lottery Company Grows Even as Scrutiny Increases N Y  TIMES Apr 4 1998 atDl
176 See id (involving Guy Snowden of G Tech) Marc Champion World s Biggest Lottery Put Up fo r Grabs Wall St J 
Aug 24 2000 at A 17
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PartIV
Historical Background
Arguably gambling activities match the classic historical example of an economic process that transfers wealth 
so rapidly and has such a destabilizing potential that governments have suppressed and criminalized most 
gambling activities While the boom and bust economic cycles created by legalized gambling activities 
appear throughout economic history two of the most recent U S cycles occurred during the 19th century 179
At the begmmng of the 1800s the United States had already interfaced its economic base with the 
gambling philosophy—primarily via lotteries 180 While scandals provided a focus for gambling opponents 181 
these opponents had then- positions bolstered by the socio economic negatives that necessarily accompany 
legalized gambling activities In most historical scenarios these business/economic negatives were reflected in 
a decrease in the quality of life which translated into a net loss of jobs the creation of large social problems 
and the necessary mcrease in various taxes to address these problems 182 Accordingly most legalized gambling 
activities were re criminalized in the 1820s and 1830s 183 After the U S Civil War gamblmg activities once 
again became fashionable and followed the expanding frontier 184 However the same socio economic problems 
occurred and with recurring scandals as catalysts virtually all gambling activities were re criminalized by 
1910
On February 11 1998 Turkey re criminalized gamblmg only 18 years after it was made legal in spite of 
the fact that the casinos employed 17 000 people and accounted for nearly one third of Turkey s tourist 
revenue 185 Government officials closed the casinos because they were convinced that the gambling halls were 
a hotbed of money launderers tax evaders and mobsters 186 The problems were so severe that the Turkish 
government closed the casinos even though it was potentially liable to casino investors for their losses 187 
Despite intense lobbying by U S gambling interests India similarly eliminated its lottery in 1997 because it 
made poor people poorer and created new and more socio economic problems Further re criminalization of 
gambling activities can be anticipated as countries look to long term economic policies for stable growth
179 For a summary of the historical background involving the cyclical legalization and re criminalization of gambling in the 
United States see I Nelson Rose The Impact o f  American Laws on Foreign Legal Gambling 8 N Y L Sch J Int L & 
Comp L 129 159 66(1986)
180 Id at 159
" I d  at 155 159 63
182 See generally Economic Impacts supra note 82 The basic negative impacts do not change although historical and 
demographical differences can provide for multiple variations
183 Rose supra note 179 at 159
184 Id at 159 60 Business Economic Impacts o f  Gambling supra note 33 at 22
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Party
Trends and Conditioning Factors
A International Land Based Casinos as Economic Cannibalization
Despite its substantial social costs gambling was being promoted globally as a revenue generating mechanism 
throughout the 1990s By 1999 North Korea was trying to cure decades of mismanagement by piggybacking on 
the high profit gambling industry 188 The Hong Kong based Emperor Group mvested m the $180 million 
Seaview Casmo Hotel located in the Rajin Sonbong area of North Korea 189 We re targeting the rich Chinese 
but there aren t plenty [sic] around now said Mr Wong an executive at the Emperor Group 190 In an effort to 
mitigate losses and recognizing the inherent destructive nature of gamblmg the North Korean government 
prohibited North Koreans from patronizing the casmo 191
In Cambodia officials closed down the two licensed casinos m Phnom Penh in 1999 after police 
established that gamblmg debts motivated most robberies murders and kidnappings m the city 192 Rather than 
substantially rid itself of the blight of gamblmg mduced social problems the Cambodian government opted to 
move the gambling operations to the Thai Cambodian border 193
Also in 1999 the West Bank town of Jericho—whose predominantly Muslim population is opposed to 
gambling on religious grounds—was enjoying newfound casmo riches 194 In 1998 the $50 million Oasis Casmo 
Resort opened drawing Israelis and foreign tourists back to the forgotten town and infusing $1 million a month 
into the local economy 195 By the turn of the century there was no available statistical data to show the 
repercussions on surrounding areas but Jericho appeared to be still experiencing the boom phase of 
gamblmg s economic cycle
B Internet Economic Cannibalization
If not prohibited by U N sponsored and general multilateral treaties Internet gamblmg will eventually destroy 
global economic stability Addiction rates associated with gamblmg exist in proportion to the speed of the 
gamblmg activity 196 The faster the gamblmg activity the more highly addictive it is and the more addictive the 
gamblmg activity is the more revenue it will generate for the industry 197 Agam this is because as Associate 
Professor Howard Shaffer of the Harvard Division on Addictions reported Gamblmg changes the 
neurochemistry of the brain 198 Reflecting on the potential unpact of Internet gamblmg Shaffer stated As 
smoking crack cocaine changed the cocaine experience I think electronics is going to change the way gamblmg 
is experienced 199 This is reinforced by studies showing that twenty seven to fifty five percent of casmo 
revenues come from pathological and problem gamblers 200 and eighty percent of casmo revenues come from
188 North Korea Opening (Gasp1)  a Casino (AP)NY Times July 31 1999 atA2 
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190 Id 
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WL 18256952
m Id
19 Deborah Sontag The Wheel o f  Fortune Turns for a Biblical Town N Y  Times Oct 29 1999 at A4 
m Id
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video gambling 201 The ubiquitous nature of Internet gambling places it m every home and with access to every 
demographic group—especially children
Internet gambling has all the characteristics of video gambling but its reach is far more sweeping and the 
potential consequences much more dire Estimates concluded that approximately nine million people had online 
investing accounts by 1999202 and that by 2003 online brokerage accounts would be valued at $3 3 trillion 203 
The implications were obvious In very little time any person with instant online access to credit card bank 
and investment accounts could incur sizable credit card debt to overseas gambling companies and lose all of 
their assets almost instantaneously
The addictive nature of the activity and its built in mega profits create a substantial market for onlme 
gambling Industry analysts valued the market at approximately $7 billion m 1999 and it was projected to rise 
to $10 billion in the year 2000 204 By 1999 there was already a significant market for online gamblmg but the 
newness size and scope of the market was luring many other potential operators At the time the Final Report 
of the 1999 U S Gamblmg Commission was published a significant number of jurisdictions already had laws 
in place to issue Internet gamblmg licenses 205 Thereafter this number continued to mcrease 206
The absence of geographical restrictions on the Internet posed an enormous problem for gamblmg 
providers as competitors Many of the onlme gamblmg sites in operation during the 1990s were based in 
offshore casinos and were subject to mmimal if any tax obligations regulation or security 207 While many 
onlme gamblers could question the integrity of these sites and be hesitant to frequent them these sites could 
also offer the best returns in the industry because their profit margins would be significantly greater than those 
market participants subject to more rigorous taxation
New entrants into the field needed to compete with the offshore casinos as must the prior existing 
land based (and primarily U S )  casino industry This intensified the competition for one country to 
economically cannibalize another country via Internet gamblmg as for example Canada had cannibalized the 
U S economy by locating casinos along the Canada U S border The U S response by the cannibalized states 
was to propose and/or build their own casinos to recapture the gamblmg dollars going to Canada—a situation 
emphasizing the U S State Department s need to negotiate amendments to its FCN bilateral and multilateral 
treaties to prohibit transboundary economic raiding via gambling activities
Regardless of these determinations another problem was that for existing gamblmg interests to remam 
profitable they would have to remam competitive with onlme gamblmg sites Obviously this scenario would 
lead to continued pressures to reduce gamblmg taxes and thereby tax revenue despite the inevitably 
accumulating social costs associated with gamblmg The Australian Productivity Commission heard arguments 
to this effect when a group of Australian casinos pointed out that if they are not to kill off their domestic 
gamblmg industries States will need to lower gamblmg taxes as competition from the Internet emerges 208 
They validly queried whether m the long run we are likely to have any alternative than a zero tax 209
C Treatment for Gambling Addictions
The 1999 U S National Gamblmg Impact Study Commission unanimously called for a pause m the expansion 
of gamblmg as part of a moratorium in part because pathological gamblmg was considered a difficult disorder
201 See id
202 Mark Ishman Computer Crimes and the Respondeat Superior Doctrine Employers Beware 6 BOSTON U J S a  & TECH 
L 6 20 (2000)
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to treat—with many experts claiming it could never be cured only repressed As with substance abuse 
treatment for pathological gamblmg is a costly time consuming effort often without quick results and with a 
high degree of re occurrence 210 The Commission credited the American Gammg Association the gamblmg 
industry s lobbying group with recognizing and taking some initiative to address the problem of pathological 
gambling However as the Commission noted industry funds earmarked for treatment for pathological 
gamblmg are miniscule compared to that industry s total revenue 211 Indeed it could be argued that the 
gamblmg industry has a vested interest in not curing pathological gamblers of their disease because pathological 
and problem gamblers constitute a major source of industry revenue
In its assessment of available treatment courses and resources for pathological gamblers 2,2 the NGISC 
listed Gamblers Anonymous as one of the most important non profit groups workmg m this area 213 The 
Commission also found the recidivism rate of pathological gamblers to be substantial and cited to the fact that 
according to the only known study assessmg the effectiveness of the Gamblers Anonymous program a mere 
eight percent of its members had abstamed from gamblmg activities at the end of a year214
Vanessa Hua s article on the high incidence of problem gamblmg in Asian American populations points to 
the magnitude of the problem facmg treatment providers In a study the Chinese Health Coalition found that 
nearly seventy percent of the Chinese Americans it surveyed ranked gamblmg as the greatest problem 
confronting then home lives and communities surpassing concerns about gangs and drugs Language and other 
cultural barriers combmed with insufficient funding has resulted m little if any recourse for those who seek 
treatment215
210 NGISC Final Report supra note 19 at 4 14 See also Hua, supra note 71 at A47 (noting the difficulty of treating 
pathological gambling m Asian Americans because of the dearth of financial resources and because cultural perceptions 
among Asian Americans make treatment difficult)
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Part VI
Policy Alternatives and Recommendations
Legalized gambling when analyzed at a strategic macro economic level was a no win proposition for 
individual countries as well as the international economy The massive amount of capital that accrues to the 
gambling industry at the expense of the public destabilizes economies by effectively foreclosing opportunities 
for new and pre existmg non gambling industries and by imposing social and rehabilitative costs on society 
which tax revenues are insufficient to cover The vast expenditure of money by pro casino interests suggested 
unbalanced decision making processes by elected officials regulatory agencies and even the court system 216
The United States needed to take a proactive approach to minimize the destructive destabilizing impact of 
the transnational economic raiding inherent in legalized gambling activities First the United States as leader of 
the international economy was prodded to spearhead international discussions concerning the viability of 
gambling as a tool for economic growth These discussions were to be conducted with the ultimate goal of 
instituting international multilateral treaties designed to combat the transnational economic raiding between 
countries caused by government sanctioned gambling activities Unfortunately efforts in this area were difficult 
due to U S domestic gambling policy—or more accurately the lack of a U S gambling policy Forcing the 
issue in the international arena without setting a workable U S standard as a model was deemed essentially 
inconsistent Until the United States committed to different policy decisions on the domestic level economic 
isolationists would argue that the United States needed to assure that its citizens were incubated from the 
dangers implicit in the spread of international legalized gambling To this end the United States would need for 
example to effectively legislate against the specialized dangers of Internet gambling relying not on outdated 
laws such as the Wire Act,217 which were designed to apply to other technology and passed in view of different 
concerns Since most transfers to Internet gambling operations are accomplished through banks or credit cards 
holding these service providers responsible for illegal gambling transactions would deter much unwanted 
behavior Absent effective measures in these types of issue areas the U S economy would be transferring a 
substantial portion of its citizens assets but not the accompanying social costs to other jurisdictions
For the United States to achieve its goal of domestic and international economic stability it needed to 
address the domestic state sanctioned gambling issue The first step required for effective change was to 
undermine the unbalanced influence pro casino interests had on the legislative processes Several measures 
needed to be taken to accomplish this goal First the federal government needed to undercut interstate 
cannibalism by assuming jurisdiction over gambling related industries by invoking the Commerce Clause The 
federal government then would have an option The U S Congress could and should with the exception of Las 
Vegas and Atlantic City (because the industry is too deeply embedded m the social fabric of the cities) ban 
legalized gambling in its entirety Preexisting gambling casinos and accompanying hotels and restaurants could 
be transformed mto educational institutions trade schools and colleges using the gambling industry s own 
revenues Although industry interests would claim substantial repercussions from such decisions they have 
already made many times their returns on investment and would lose nothing while the states would gain an 
educated public as well as new consumer dollars pump priming the economy A decision to this end would also 
mitigate the problems surrounding ill adapted and deficient treatment programs for pathological and problem 
gamblers Short of this measure the federal government should impose a tax structure upon legalized gambling 
operations that reflects the cost they impose on society such as the Canadian model where taxes are 100 percent 
with only management fees going to the casino companies The U S government should appropriate the 
revenue collected and allocate it to treatment and rehabilitation programs for pathological and problem 
gamblers as well as for educational buy outs of the gambling establishments
216 Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995 supra note 32 at 520
21718 U S C § 1084 (criminalizing wagenng that utilizes wire communication)
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Part VII
Conclusion
The United States wields an enormous amount of power in determining global policy and bears a proportionate 
burden to structure its economy to minimize deprivation poverty and instability Legalized gambling is an 
enormous problem for both the U S and the international economies The inherently addictive nature of 
gambling activities makes it an untenable burden on society Strategic cost benefit analysis shows that gambling 
is a no win proposition for the United States and for the world The United States has created a global trend 
toward the legalization of gambling activities This has spurred a system of transnational economic raiding 
which produces insufficient revenue to cover the bankruptcy crime and corruption costs associated with these 
activities The U S Congress has the power to reverse the global trend of economic cannibalism poverty and 
instability and its first step toward this end should be to incubate the United States from the destructive forces 
of Internet gambling The Congress should also recognize that legalizing gambling activities falls far short of 
maximizing the public health safety and welfare of U S citizens and should legislate nationally on the issue 
This will give the United States the credibility it needs to effect a change in global perspective and to encourage 
economic stability in the maintenance of a favorable world legal order
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